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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
J. LOWELL PLATT, d/b/a 
CRYSTAL POOLS, INC., 
Pla~ntiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
C. L. LO,CKE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 9238 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
That on or about the 1 day of April 1958 Plaintiff 
and Defendant entered into a written contract as shown 
by Exhibit "A" attached to Plaintiff's complaint whereby 
Plaintiff agreed to install for the Defendant a swimming 
pool for which payment was to be made by the Defendant 
in four stages and as the work proceeded i.e. 15% first 
stage; 60% second stage; 20% third stage and balance 
of 5% upon competion. (Exhibit P-1) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
Plaintiff completed the first 15% stage and was paid 
therefore but upon completion of the second 60% stage 
which amounted to 75% of the work being completed and 
payment due the Defendant stalled the Plaintiff off until 
Plaintiff had for all purposes and effects completed the 
third 20% stage (R43) and fourth 5% stage, at which 
time the Defendant informed the Plaintiff that he 
would pay Plaintiff only if the Plaintiff would put in 
the water and gas lines to the pool which were specific-
ally marked out as not an obligation of the Plaintiff 
to do. (R. 32, Exhibit P-1, item 8) 
When Plaintiff refused to be fool enough to be 
pressured into doing that, which he was not obligated 
under the contract to do, the Defendant voluntarily and 
wilfully stopped the Plaintiff from working on the pool 
and refused to pay to the Plaintiff any further money 
whatsoever (R. 121, item 6 and court notice thereof R31; 
R39; R82) 
The only justification for non payment put forth 
by the Defendant "ras that the Plaintiff did not hold a 
Specialty 'Contractors License to build swimming pools 
(R121 item 9 and court notice thereof R32) notwith-
standing the fact, to be, that the Plaintiff had in full 
force and effect a General Building Contractors License 
(R121 item 8 and court notice thereon R32) and the 
further reason that the Plaintiff had filed no affidavit 
with the County Clerk of Salt Lake County of doing 
business under an assu1ned na1ne. (R21 ite1n 12 and court 
notice thereof R32). 
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srrATEMENT OF l:)OINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT 
FOR RESPONDEN'T ON THE GROUND THAT AS A MAT-
TER OF LAW APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO JUDG-
MENT FOR THE REASON THAT RESPONDENT WAS NOT 
A PROPERLY QUALIFIED AND LICEN'SED SPECIAUTY 
CONTRACTOR AS REQUIRED BY LAW. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPEL-
LANT'S MOTION FOR A SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MO:TION 
OF APPELLANT TO ENTER JUDGMENT FOR DEFEND-
ANT OR, IN THE ALTERN~TIVE, TO SET ASIDE THE 
JUDGMENT ENTERED HEREIN AND GRANT A NEW 
TRIAL. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPEL-
LANT'S MOTION TO AMEND AND SUPPLEMENT FIND-
INGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
POINT V. 
RESPONDENT WAS DOING BUSINESS UNDER AN 
ASSUMED NAME AND FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE 
PROVISIONS OF SECTION 42-2-1, UTAH CODE ANNO·-
TATED, 1953 AND RESPONDENT'S ALLEGED CONTRACT 
IS VOID AND UNENFORCEABLE. 
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POINT VI. 
AS THE CAS.E RESTED RESPONDENT FAILED TO 
PROVE ANY BASIS FOR RELIEF ON THE GROUND THAT 
THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY SHOWED THE CON-
TRACT WAS MADE BY RESPONDENT AS AN AGENT FOR 
A NO:N-EXISTENT PRINCIPAL. 
ARGUMENT 
Appellant has chosen to not comment on his first 
two points, Respondent, shall do likewise. For practical 
purposes Respondent makes the following argument to 
Appellant's remaining three points, numbered 3, 4, and 5. 
Basically there is only one question to he answered 
in this ease and it is : 
Is the contract under which the Respondent did work 
for the Ap·pellant good~ 
App·ellant does not deny that the work was done, 
but instead sought means, by failing to pay therefore, 
to make the Respondent do more ":ork and incur more 
expenses not conten1plated or provided for in the con-
tract. When Respondent refused to be high pressured, 
Appellant now seeks to evade pay1nent as provided by 
the contract by contending (1) that Respondent did not 
have a Specialties Contractors License to build SYfimming 
pools; (2) had not filed an affidavit of doing business 
under an assu1ned name in the Salt Lake County Clerk's 
Office and (3) that Respondent \vas an agent acting 
without authority. 
~concerning Appellant's contention (1) that Respond-
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ent did not have a Specialties License to build swimming 
pools, Appellant prudently ignores the fact that Respond-
ent did have in full force and effect a general contractor's 
license at all times material to this case. 
As a licensed General Building Contractor he was 
within the definition of contractor set forth and defined 
by Sec. 58-23-3(3) Utah Code Annotated 1953 as follows: 
"Any person** who for a fixed sum** under-
takes with another for the construction, ** addi-
tion to or improvement of any ** excavation or 
other ** p·roject, development or improvement, 
other than to personalty, or any part thereof." 
There is no question that prior to the effective day 
of May 14, 1957, when the law providing for specialty 
classifications being made, common in the trade, that 
anyone holding a general contractor's license could have 
contracted lawfully to undertake with another for the 
construction of "any structure ** requiring in its con-
struction the use of more than two unrelated building 
trades or crafts or to do or superintend the whole or 
any part thereof" and could have lawfully undertaken 
with another for the construction of an outside garage, 
fireplace or swimming pool. (R22) 
Appellant at page 8 of his brief cites Sec. 58-23-9 
(1) (b) as authority for limiting the holder of a General 
Contractor's License to a specific structure and for a 
specific purpose. 
The Utah State Attorney General in an opinion dated 
the 23 day of September 1959 directed to John Chase, 
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Administrator, Department of Contractors, in a detailed 
opinion which concerns itself with the entire question 
we are here discussing states as follows: 
"Under the provisions of the old law, prior 
to 1957, only one license was provided for. There 
were no classifications and ·the contractor in pos-
session of such a license could lawfully engage 
in any or all of the numerous contracting fields." 
"The terms of the statute the general build-
ing license is broad. Note particularly subsection 
58-23-9 (1) (b) of the section that the general build-
ing contractor is one ** requiring ** the use of 
more than two unrelated building trades or crafts 
** is significant in that it does not restrict the 
general building contractor from engaging in 
certain specialty fields. Furthermore, the general 
building contractor may do or superintend the 
whole of any part of the building or structure. 
The erection of a home, grocery store or factory 
involves the use of numerous contracting field 
(specialties). The statute obviously allows the 
holder of such a license to do or superintend any 
or all of such specialties.'' 
"If a contractor is qualified to perform spe-
cialty work on one project, it \\'ould be unreason-
able to say that he could not perform the same 
work on another project.'' 
"If the Depart1nent determines that an Appli-
cant for a general builder's license n1ust qualify 
in excavation, n1asonry, carpentry and roofing, 
etc., then the general building contractor's license 
entitles the holder to engage in such specialties 
either as a part of a building contract '':rhich the 
holder has, or on an individual or special con-
tract.'' 
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The Legislature placed in the new 1957 law which 
first became effective on the 14 day of May 1957 a not 
less than a one year "grandaddy clause", Section 58-23-13 
( 4), as follows: 
"All licensed con tractors in the state as of 
the effective date of this act shall be entitled to 
continue the business of contracting upon comply-
ing with the provisions of this act relating to the 
filing of renewal applications, fees, as herein 
provided." 
The Utah State Attorney General in an opinion dated 
the 4 day of February 1959, directed to John Chase, 
Director, Department of Contractors, in a detailed opin-
ion which concerned itself with the foregoing, states as 
follows: 
"The provisions of the statute, quoted above, 
Section 58-23-13 ( 4) allowing a contractor previ-
ously licensed to obtain a renewal license upon 
payment of the lesser fee, must have been in-
tended to offer relief to contractors licensed, 
under the old law. The provision, however, must 
have reasonable limits. We do not believe it was 
intended to permit contractors to obtain more 
than one renewal license.'' 
It is submitted that the new act became effective 
the 14 day of May 1957, the first renewal that could 
possibly occur would be for the year of 1958. Respondent 
renewed his General Contractors License effective for 
the entire year of 1958 and thereunder contracted with 
the Appellant on April1, 1958, it necessarily follows that 
he was properly licensed at the time said contract was 
executed. 
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Concerning Appellant's contention (2) that he should 
not have to pay because Respondent had not filed an 
affidavit of doing business under an assumed name, 
Respondent must agree with Ap-pellant's familiarity with 
the fact that the majority view entertained by the courts 
is that the legislature did not intend to impose a penalty 
on the offender of refusing him relief on contracts or 
transactions without compliance. Authority for the ma-
jority view and minority view, if any there be, may be 
found in 38 Am. Jur. 601 et. Sec. 13-16, 18 ALR 282, 45 
ALR 198, 59 ALR 455 and 42 .ALR 2d 516 (see III Sect. 
4@ p. 524. 
This Court in the case of Olsen v. Reese, 114 Ut. 411, 
200 P 2d 733 in holding that a contractor's license was 
necessary for the recovery stated: 
"Our statute is so worded as to indicate a 
legislative intent to protect the citizens from irre-
sponsible contractors. The Statute while not com-
prehensive, provides for a small license fee. Con-
trol over the contractor is given to the Depart-
ment of Registration. Upon an appropriate hear-
ing, the department may, for unprofessional con-
duct, suspend or cancel the license. Good reputa-
tion and integrity are essential to obtaining a 
license and the entire object of the statute is 
protection of the public against fraudulent and 
illegal practice, 'Yhich have always been recog-
nized as a distinct characteristic of statutes, which 
are not' mere revenue measures. The statute being 
enacted for the protection of the public, Plain-
tiff's written contract is void ****". 
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It is submitted that none of the foregoing reasons 
are even remotely applicable to the filing of an affidavit 
of doing business under an assumed name. 
1. There is no license involved. 
2. Control is given to no department to admill-
ister. 
3. No hearings are held. 
4. Professional or unprofessional may file alike. 
5. Good conduct, reputation or integrity are not 
essential to filing. 
6. The statute in no way protects the public 
against fraudulent or illegal practices. 
This court has recognized and referred to the statute 
relative to doing business under an assumed name in 
the cases of : 
Christensen v. Johnson, 90 U t. 273, 61 P 2d 597 
Green v. Nelson, 120 Ut. 155, 232 P 2d 776 
and the question has been p~ointedly ruled upon by the 
Federal Court in the case of John Oakason and Thomas 
N. Deglas d/b/a Western St,ates Map Company v. Lisbon 
Valley Uranium Company, 154 Fed. Sup. 692, wherein 
Judge A. Sherman ·Christensen held : 
"Non compliance with Utah assumed name 
statute would not preclude recovery by Plaintiff 
otherwise entitled to recovery for services ren-
dered under a contract, since such Statute is 
primarily for the convenience of the public rather 
than protection of the public U.c·.A. 1953, 42-2-1, 
42-2-4. '' 
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Concerning Appellant's contention (3) that Respond-
ent was an agent acting without authority. 
Appellant contends that the trial judge erred in 
remarking that the Respondent was bound because he 
was the agent for a non-existent principal, and, therefore, 
he was hound himself. (R98) 
The trial judge also remarked that the Respondent 
did not need a license to make this contract. (R98) 
The trial judge in making the comments that he 
did, was not ignoring the evidence that Appellant knew 
that Respondent was not incorporated (Rl9) or that 
it is necessary that Appellant must have a contractors 
license. ( R32) 
He was in effect commenting on the fact that even 
in the event Respondent did not have a Specialty Con-
t.rator's License and had of been the agent of an undis-
closed principal that the Appellant could have held the 
Respondent liable under any and all such circumstances. 
In view of the undisputed testimony that Appellant 
knew that Respondent was not incorporated (R19), that 
he chose to breach the contract after milking the Appel-
lant for all he could (R39), his lack of complaints as to 
the performance of Respondent's worln11anship and per-
formance, and being an acknowledged businessman 
versed in the meanings and obligations of contracts (R84) 
he was well aware that he was dealing with J. Lowell 
Platt, d/b/a Crystal Pools Inc. and as the contractor 
referred to in Exhibit P-1 which Appellant contends at 
page 17 of his brief to be "an una1nbiguous, integrated 
contract.'' 
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Appellant further contends at page 17 of his brief 
''under the circumstances presented in this case the Re-
spondent is now estopped from denying the existence of 
"Crystal Pools, Inc.," which he dealt with as a corpora-
tion." It is submitted that it is not the Respondent that 
co1nes to this court or any court with dirty hands, it is 
not the Respondent that breached this contract, it is not 
the Appellant that has been hurt and if estop·pel must 
be invoked for giving equitable relief in view of the trial 
evidence, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
made and entered in this case, then such estoppel, if 
any there be, should be against the Appellant and in 
favor of Respondent. 
In the case of Whipple v. Fuller, 5 Ut. 2d 211, 299 
P 2d 837 this court states at page 213 of said Utah 
Reporter: 
"For Appellant to escape liability on "the 
failure to be licensed theory" would subvert the 
theory of the law." As the California Court said 
in Matchett v. Gould "**recovery can be had upon 
the contract in the absence of a license when equity 
and good conscience dictate such relief as an 
alternative to a judgment which would convert a 
law intended for the safety and p-rotection of the 
public into an unwarranted shield for the avoid-
ance of a just obligation.'' 
Finally - It is submitted that the Legislature can-
not lawfully delegate to the Administrator of the Dept. 
of ·Contractors the legislative power to determine by 
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his thoughts alone which workers must have specialty 
licenses and when. There is here, by Appellant's own 
admission, a "unambiguous, integrated'' contract which 
was entered into fairly and squarely by the Respondent. 
If the contract is good he should be entitled to seek re-
lief thereunder and if the contract is not a good contract 
he should be hurt. 
Respondent submits that the trial court did not com-
mit error in finding for the Respondent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE H. SEARLE 
Attorney for Respotzdent 
2520 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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